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Free Trade and the Environment
what should environmentalists say about free trade? Many environmentalists object to free 
trade by appealing the “Race to the Bottom Argument.” This argument is inconclusive, but 
there are reasons to worry about unrestricted free trade’s environmental effects nonetheless; 
the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as the World Trade Organization may be 
unjustifiable. Programs to compensate for trade-related environmental damage, appropriate 
trade barriers, and consumer movements may be necessary and desirable. At least environ-
mentalists should consider these alternatives to unrestricted free trade if they do not prevent 
the achievement of other important moral objectives, can efficiently reduce environmental 
problems, and institutional safeguards can prevent their abuse.
 * Philosophy Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. Hassoun is affiliated 
with Carnegie Mellon's Program on International Relations and the Center for Bioethics and Health 
Law at the University of Pittsburgh. She writes primarily on political philosophy and ethics and focuses, 
in particular, on global economic and environmental justice. She is also interested in methodological 
issues in philosophy and the other social sciences. Her articles have been accepted in journals such as 
the American Philosophical Quarterly, Public Affairs Quarterly, and Utilitas. The author thanks Leif 
Wenar, Darrel moellendorf, Bill Oberdick, Jason matteson, Nicholas Weinhold, michael Goodheart, 
Luc Bovens, Sarah Wright, Will Braynen, John Farnum, Teddy Seidenfeld, Thomas Christiano, Gillian 
Brock, michael Gill, Jerry Gaus, Allen Buchanan, Geoffrey Brenan, and referees for Environmental 
Ethics, John M. Gowdy and Thomas Micheal Power, for helpful comments. Thanks are also due to 
audiences at the University of Colorado, the University of Delaware, the University of Tennessee, 
the American Philosophical Association, the University of North Carolina, and especially the Vienna 
International Summer University at which predecessors to this paper were presented. Finally, the author 
is thankful for the support she received from the American Association and the Earhart Foundation 
during the course of the project. She sincerely apologizes to anyone she has forgotten to mention. 
This essay expands upon some ideas in Nicole Hassoun, “Free Trade, Poverty, and the Environment,” 
Public Affairs Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2008): 353–80. This essay’s second half also draws on many of 
the arguments in that paper in considering objections to using trade policy to protect the environment. 
That paper, however, also considers an argument for free trade from a concern for the global poor.
Nicole Hassoun*
I. INTRODUCTION
 what should environmentalists say about free trade? In this paper, I consider the 
case for free trade on the assumption that there is an obligation to mitigate envi-
ronmental problems. Many environmentalists object to free trade by appealing the 
“Race to the Bottom Argument.” This argument is inconclusive, considering some 
of the empirical evidence regarding free trade’s environmental impact. Although 
there is not enough evidence to decide whether free trade will generally be good 
or bad for the environment, there is reason to worry about the environmental ef-
fects of unrestricted free trade; the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as 
the world Trade Organization (wTO) may be unjustifiable. Linkage, consumer 
movements (such as the Sustainable Forestry and Fair Trade Initiatives), and trade 
barriers may be necessary and desirable. At least, environmentalists should consider 
these alternatives to unrestricted free trade if they do not prevent us from achieving 
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other important moral objectives, environmental impact assessments suggest they 
can efficiently reduce environmental problems, and institutional safeguards can 
prevent their abuse.
II. NORMATIVE FRAMEwORk
 The world is beset with serious environmental problems. Climate change is hap-
pening.1 Acid rain, water pollution, desertification, extinctions, and destruction of 
rain forest are well documented.2 many of these problems could have devastating 
consequences for humans, other species, ecosystems, and even the biosphere.3 
 There are many reasons to care about these problems. Some are anthropocentric or 
human-based. Others are nonanthropocentric starting from a concern for individual 
animals or plants,4 ecosystems or the biosphere.5 most environmentalists can agree, 
however, that a good environmental ethic requires ameliorating environmental 
problems. 
 Consider, for instance, how those who are only concerned about sustainable 
development for humans’ sakes might argue. Sustainable development is develop-
ment that meets the needs of present generations without undermining the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. Environmental problems such as climate 
change and water pollution impose direct non-negligible risks of serious harm to 
humans in all generations. Such environmental problems, in virtue of threatening 
nonhuman individuals, other species, and ecosystems, also indirectly pose risks 
of serious harm to humans in future generations.6 Those who are concerned about 
sustainable development have reason to mitigate environmental problems.
 Next, consider how an animal welfare ethicist might argue for mitigating en-
vironmental problems. Peter Singer advances what is perhaps the most famous 
animal welfare theory. According to Singer, what matters is maximizing pleasure 
and minimizing pain for all sentient creatures.7 Environmental problems such as 
desertification and destruction of rain forest impose non-negligible risk of serious 
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harm to many sentient species.8 So those who care about animal welfare might 
conclude that there is reason to mitigate such problems.
 Third, consider what those who think we must treat all teleological subjects of a 
life as members of our moral community might say about environmental problems. 
Tom Regan gives one account of what it means to say we must treat all teleologi-
cal subjects of a life as members of our moral community. He says a creature is 
the subject of a life when it has beliefs, desires, perception, memory, identity, a 
sense of (its own) future, emotions, preferences, interests, the ability to act on and 
pursue goals, and the ability to fare well or poorly.9 Regan believes that most year-
old mammals have such lives and that being the subject of a life is necessary and 
sufficient for moral consideration. On Regan’s theory, we cannot harm creatures 
that deserve moral consideration except in self-defense and similarly extraordi-
nary circumstances. Anthropogenic climate change and many other environmental 
problems impose non-negligible risk of serious harm on teleological centers of a 
life.10 So, on Regan’s theory, we must mitigate these problems.
 Finally, consider an environmental ethic on which we should protect ecosystems 
and the biosphere for their own sakes.11 Because environmental problems will al-
most certainly eliminate some species and reduce biodiversity, such problems will 
probably negatively impact ecosystems and the biosphere. Even if humans could 
completely adapt to environmental problems, something that is almost certainly 
impossible, mitigation, would be necessary to protect many parts of nature that 
cannot adapt.12 So those who believe ecosystems and the biosphere deserve moral 
consideration should agree that we must mitigate environmental problems at least 
a little. 
 many of the environmental ethics canvassed require much more than mitigating 
environmental problems. We might, for instance, mitigate environmental problems 
without maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain for all sentient life, respecting te-
leological centers of a life, or protecting ecosystems and the biosphere. There are 
also many other environmental ethics on which there is an obligation to mitigate 
environmental problems. But, because environmental problems are likely to harm 
humans, other species, ecosystems, and the biosphere, most environmentalists will 
agree that there is an obligation to mitigate environmental problems.13 So, in this 
paper I do not try to find the limit of our obligations or arbitrate between these 
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neglected. See, for instance, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents (New York: Norton: 
2002).
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companies in pollution havens may be more likely to attract capital. See Rhys Jenkins, “Environmental 
Regulation and International Competitiveness: A Review of Literature and Some European Evidence,” 
The United Nations University Institute for New Technologies Discussion Paper Series, Mastricht: 
United Nations University, January 1998 draft.
different theories. I simply assume that, in terms of a sound environmental ethic, 
there is an obligation to mitigate environmental problems.14
III. THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS’ CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE
 Environmentalists often argue that free trade harms the environment. They sug-
gest, for instance, that trade increases production and transportation. Production 
and transportation, the environmentalists argue, produce waste and use scarce sinks 
(such as the atmosphere) that absorb waste.15 Although these environmentalists 
recognize that free trade brings technological change, they hold that new technolo-
gies create at least as many problems as they solve. Finally, these environmentalists 
argue that free trade generates incentives for countries to reduce environmental 
regulation, thereby creating environmental problems.16 most of these claims are, 
essentially, empirical. The last worry about regulation, however, is backed by an 
interesting theoretical argument. So, in the next two subsections, I set out and 
critique this portion of the environmentalists’ argument against free trade. I then 
turn to the empirical evidence regarding free trade’s environmental impact.
 The Race To The boTTom aRgumenT
 Perhaps the most famous argument for the conclusion that free trade will decrease 
environmental standards is the “Race to the Bottom Argument.” The basic idea 
is simple. Free trade makes it easier for industries to locate in different countries. 
Countries have different environmental regulations. So companies have incentives 
to move to countries with laxer regulatory standards. Because countries realize this, 
and want to retain or attract industry, they have an incentive to reduce environmental 
regulations. Ceteris paribus, these incentives lead companies to move to countries 
with laxer regulations (a.k.a., pollution havens) and countries to reduce regulations.17 
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Because many companies relocate, they emit more pollution than they would 
without free trade.18 
 Environmentalists can allow for the possibility that non-trade-related incentives 
to raise regulatory standards might balance out or even outweigh the incentives free 
trade creates to lower standards. But, even if standards do not fall, the “Race to the 
Bottom Argument” implies that free trade will have caused more environmental 
damage than would have otherwise occurred. If a race is occurring, standards would 
have been higher without free trade.
 cRiTique of The “Race To The boTTom aRgumenT”
 One potential objection to the “Race to the Bottom Argument” starts from the 
observation that free trade may induce economic growth. This growth may allow 
countries to avoid downward pressure on environmental standards. when countries 
are wealthier, they might be able to maintain their current levels of regulation even 
in the face of competitive pressure. It is even possible that free trade will increase 
demand for environmental regulation as it increases economic growth.19 Regula-
tory standards may start to rise if countries can afford stricter regulatory standards 
as free trade increases their incomes. Countries may even reduce pollution and the 
severity of environmental problems more quickly with free trade. This is known 
as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis.20
 The “Race to the Bottom Argument” might be correct in asserting that free trade 
has increased and will continue to increase competitive pressure on industries. But 
if labor costs swamp the costs of complying with environmental regulations, indus-
tries may not respond to incentives to locate in countries with fewer environmental 
regulations. To survive in a freely trading economy, industries may, instead, have 
to move to the countries with the lowest labor costs, even if those countries have 
high environmental standards.
 what is actually happening and what will happen in the future as a result of free 
trade is not clear a priori. It is possible that the “Race to the Bottom Argument” is 
right. But it is also possible that the argument has never been correct. 
 Furthermore, there are many other potential problems with the “Race to the 
Bottom Argument.” Companies may prefer not to increase pollution, for instance, 
even in countries with lax regulatory standards. It may be better for companies to 
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ronmental regulation on trade and avoid endogeniety problems. Of course, other factors could explain 
the correlations they find. See Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, “Is Trade Good or Bad for the Envi-
ronment? Sorting out the Causality,” Review of Economics and Statistics 87, no. 1 (2005): 3–9 (page 
numbers from the September 2004 draft).
 24 Grossman and Kruger use panel data. See Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, “Environmental 
Impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper 3914 (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991). 
invest in environmentally sound technology at the outset than to face the possibility 
of having to adapt to rising standards in the future. Alternately, other trade-related 
incentives may counterbalance the impact of a race if one is happening. Trade might, 
for instance, yield new technologies that reduce environmental damage. (Although, 
of course, trade might also yield technologies that increase environmental damage.) 
The important point is just that the “Race to the Bottom Argument” is not decisive 
on its own.
IV. FREE TRADE IN PRACTICE
 The argument for a race to the bottom provides one mechanism through which 
free trade might contribute to environmental problems. I have already noted, how-
ever, that there are other ways that free trade might contribute to such problems. 
Free trade might, for instance, increase waste or eliminate scarce sinks simply by 
increasing the scale of the economy. In this section, I consider some of free trade's 
other environmental impacts as well.21
 One of the most extensive studies of trade’s impact on the environment is 
Frankel and Rose’s “Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting out the 
Causality.” Frankel and Rose looked for correlations between free trade, SO2, NO2, 
CO2, deforestation, and energy depletion rates.
22 They found that trade has had a 
beneficial effect on deforestation, SO2, NO2, and energy depletion rates and has 
had an insignificant negative impact on CO2.
23
 Grossman and krueger completed a similar study with similar results.24 They found 
evidence that is consistent with the EkC hypothesis: they found that countries 
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 25 Comparable estimates are given in Theodore Panayotou, Green Markets: The Economics of 
Sustainable Development (San Francisco: ICP Press, 1993). 
emissions of SO2, for instance, increase until their GNPs per capita are between 
4–5,000 U.S. dollars per year.25 Figure 1 shows an EkC that peaks when coun-
tries’ GNPs reach about 4,000 U.S. dollars. 
FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
 Given that these estimates of the point at which environmental conditions will 
improve are fairly close to the income level of the average country, one might think 
this is good news. Perhaps further free trade will start to reduce environmental 
degradation.
 Unfortunately, there are two reasons why this argument is not convincing. First, data 
for some indicators of environmental quality are not nearly as promising. Sometimes 
Figure 1. The EKC Hypothesis. Graph from David Stern, “The Rise and Fall of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve,” World development 32, no. 8 (2004): 1420.
Table 1. Estimated EKC Turning Points for Air Pollutants in U.S. Dollars. Table modi-
fied from E. B. Barbier, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Environmental kuznets 
Curves,” Environment and development Economics 2, no. 4 (1997): 375.
humankind ‘‘have our cake and eat it’’ (Rees,
1990, p. 435).
The EKC is an essentially empirical phe-
nomenon, but most of the EKC literature is
econometrically weak. In particular, little or no
attention has been paid to the statistical prop-
erties of the data used––such as serial depen-
dence or stochastic trends in time-series 1––and
little consideration has been paid to issues of
model adequacy such as the possibility of
omitted variables bias. 2 Most studies assume
that, if the regression coeﬃcients are nominally
individually or jointly signiﬁcant and have the
expected signs, then an EKC relation exists.
However, one of the main purposes of doing
econometrics is to test which apparent rela-
tionships, or ‘‘stylized facts,’’ are valid and
which are spurious correlations.
When we do take diagnostic statistics and
speciﬁcation tests into account and use appro-
priate techniques, we ﬁnd that the EKC does
not exist (Perman & Stern, 2003). Instead, we
get a more realistic view of the eﬀect of eco-
nomic growth and technological changes on
environmental quality. It seems that emissions
of most pollutants and ﬂows of waste are
monotonically rising with income, though the
‘‘income elasticity’’ is less than one and is not a
simple function of income alone. Income-inde-
pendent, time-related eﬀects reduce environ-
mental impacts in countries at all levels of
income. The new (post-Brundtland) conven-
tional wisdom that developing countries are
‘‘too poor to be green’’ (Martinez-Alier, 1995)
is, itself, lacking in wisdom. In rapidly growing
middle-income countries, however the scale
eﬀect, which increases pollution and other
degradation, overwhelms the time eﬀect. In
wealthy countri s, growth is slower, and pol-
lution reduction eﬀorts can overcome the scale
eﬀect. This is the origin of the apparent EKC
eﬀect. The econometric results are supported by
recent evidence that, in fact, pollution problems
are being addressed and remedied in developing
economies (e.g., Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang, &
Wheeler, 2002).
This paper follows the development of the
EKC concept in approximately chronological
order. I do not attempt to review or cite all of
the rapidly growing number of studies. The
next two sections of the paper review in more
detail the theory behind the EKC and the
econometric methods used in EKC studies. The
following sections review some EKC analyses
and their critique. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the
more important recent developments that have
changed the picture that we have of the EKC.
The ﬁnal sections discuss alternative approa-
ches––decomposition of emissions and eﬃcient
frontiers––and summarize the ﬁndings.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The EKC concept emerged in the early 1990s
with Grossman and Krueger’s (1991) path-
breaking study of the potential impacts of
NAFTA and Shaﬁk and Bandyopadhyay’s
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Figure 1. Environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur emissions. Source: Panayotou (1993) and Stern, Common, and
Barbier (1996).
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Air Polution SO2 SPM NOx CO CO2 CFCs
Cole et al. (1997) $6,900 $7,300 $14,700 $9,900 $12,600
Grossman and Krueger (1993) $4,107
Grossman and Kruger (1995) $4,053
Holtz-Ekin and Selden (1995) $35,400
Moomawand Unruh (1997) $12,800
Panayoutou (1995) $3,000 $4,500 $5,500
Panayoutou (1997) $5,000
Selden and S g (1994) $10,700 $9,600 $21,800 $19,100
Shafik (1994) $36.700 $32,300
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Georgetown international Environmental Law Review 12, no. 2 (2000): 523–41. Also see Håkan 
Nordström and Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment, World Trade Organization Special Studies 4 
(Geneva: world Trade Organization, 1999).
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ment?” Department of Economics University of British Columbia working Paper Number 98–11, 
Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia, 1998.
the projected improvement in environmental conditions only happens at very high 
average income levels.26 Consider some estimated turning points for the EKC for 
different air pollutants in U.S. dollars (Table 1, above).27
 Second, even if Grossman and Kruger’s data are correct, this prediction is 
mistaken. Most countries have incomes far below average. So, we might use the 
median income level to better approximate the point at which environmental con-
ditions will start to improve. Figure 2 below shows projected emissions of SO2 
using the EkC and world Bank projections for economic and population growth.28 
According to these projections, emissions of SO2 are not expected to peak until 
about 2025. Environmental conditions may not start to improve soon even if the 
EKC hypothesis is correct.
 There are also many reasons to worry about whether the EkC hypothesis is 
right. One worry is that the EkC does not appear to hold in many cases.29 Several 
Figure 2. Projected Emissions of SO2 Using EkC and world Bank Projections. From 
David Stern. “The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” World devel-
opment 32, no. 8 (2004): 1437.
economists argue that the EKC only holds for local pollutants such as SO2 and NOx, 
not for pollutants such as CO2 that have far-ranging impacts and are most likely to 
lead to climate change.30 Others argue that the statistical basis for historical EKC 
the EKC. In our ﬁnite world the poor countries
of today would be unable to ﬁnd further
countries from which to import resource-
intensive products as they, themselves, become
wealthy. When the poorer countries apply
similar levels of environmental regulation they
would face the more diﬃcult task of abating
these activities rather than outsourcing them to
other countries (Arrow et al., 1995; Stern et al.,
1996). Copeland an Taylor (2004) conclude
that, in contrast to earlier work (e.g., Jaﬀe,
Peterson, Portney, & Stavins, 1995), recent
research shows that increased regulation does
tend to result in mo e decisions to locate in less
regulated locations. On the other hand, there is
no clear evide ce that trade liberalization
results in a shift in polluting activities to less-
regulated countries.
Furthermore, Antweiler, Copeland, and
Taylor (2001) and Cole and Elliott (2003) argue
that the capital-intensive activities that are
concentrated in the developed countries are
more polluting and hence developed countries
have a natural comparative advantage in pol-
luting goods in the absence of regulatory dif-
ferences. There are no clear answers on the
impact of trade on pollution from the empirical
EKC literature.
Stern et al. (1996) argued tha early EKC
studies showed that a number of indicators:
SO2 emissions, NOx, nd deforestation, peak at
income levels around the current world mean
per capita income. A cursory glance at the
available econometric estimates might have
lead one to believe that, given likely future
levels of mean income per capita, environmen-
tal degradation should decline from the present
onward. This interpretation is evident in the
1992 World Development Report (IBRD, 1992).
Income is not however, normally distributed
but very skewed, with much larger numbers of
people below mean income per capita than
bove it. Therefore, it is median rather than
mean income that is the relevant variable. Sel-
den an Song (1994) and Stern et al. (1996)
performed simulations that, assuming that the
EKC relationship is valid, showed that global
environmental degradation was set to rise for a
long time to c me. Figure 2 prese ts projected
sulfur emissions using the EKC in Figure 1 and
UN and World Bank forecasts of economic and
population growth. Despite this and despite
recent estimates that indicate higher or nonex-
istent turning points, the impression produced
by the early studies in the policy, academic, and
business communities seems slow to fade (e.g.,
Lomborg, 2001).
6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Signiﬁcant developments, since my last gen-
eral survey of the EKC in 1998, fall into three
classes: (a) Empirical case study evidence on
environmental performance and policy in
developing cou tries th t is discussed in this
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Figure 2. Projected sulfur emissions. Source: Stern et al. (1996).
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see ibid, pp. 1419–39.
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 36 mayell, “Climate Studies Point to more Floods in This Century.”
 37 Studies also show that the scale effect is not offset by technological change in some sectors. 
Evidence suggests that in the agricultural sector, for instance, technological change has not offset 
the scale effect. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America, “Free Trade and 
the Environment: The Picture Becomes Clearer,” North American Symposium on Understanding the 
Linkages between Trade and the Environment (Quebec: Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
of North America, 2002), pp. 26–27. 
 38 There is a different way of challenging the “Race to the Bottom Argument” empirically that is 
also worth mentioning. Several economists have looked at whether industries actually tend to move to 
low regulation environments from high regulation environments with free trade. Many argue that the 
impact of environmental regulation on industry location decisions is very small or non-existent. See 
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studies is weak and that growth, as the environmentalist contends, may even be 
correlated with monotonic increases in overall environmental degradation.31 
 Fortunately, it is not necessary to discuss the technical problems with these stud-
ies here.32 Even granting that the data supporting the EKC are correct, the EKC 
hypothesis needs further defense. Some argue that the data may be explained by 
the fact that countries usually start importing pollution intensive goods when their 
incomes increase. There is some evidence that pollution intensive manufacturing 
is shifting to developing countries.33 So, we do not know what will happen when 
everyone’s income increases.34 Obviously, someone has to produce the pollution 
intensive goods if they are still consumed.
 Significant increases in environmental problems may occur even if environmental 
conditions eventually improve in all countries. The costs of trade-induced growth 
may outweigh the benefits. If, for instance, global warming melts the polar ice 
caps, many ecosystems will be irreversibly damaged. This damage will probably 
increase the rate of natural disasters and transmission of devastating diseases like 
malaria.35 Other species and ecosystems may also suffer.36 
 The empirical evidence on how free trade will impact the environment canvassed 
here is not conclusive.37 we lack sufficiently rigorous data to predict whether the 
net effect of trade-induced growth will be good or bad for the environment.38 But 
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 39 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Reforming Coal and Electricity 
Subsidies,” Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
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no matter what the net effect of free trade on the environment will be, we can be 
reasonably certain that free trade will have mixed effects. Some free trade reforms 
are probably good for the environment, while others are probably devastating for 
the environment. 
 Consider how free trade in the energy sector is likely to have mixed impacts. 
Some energy sources are better for the environment than others. Fossil fuels like coal 
and oil are some of the dirtiest energy sources contributing a lot to environmental 
problems like climate change. The World Bank suggested that fossil fuel consump-
tion subsidies alone were over 200 billion U.S. dollars in 1992.39 These subsidies, 
because they reduce prices, usually increase consumption and pollution. Thus, reducing 
these subsidies might mitigate many environmental problems.40 Since other energy 
sources, such as wind and geothermal, are better for the environment,41 it would 
probably be bad if subsidies for alternative energy sources were eliminated.42
 All other things being equal, the obligation to mitigate environmental problems 
provides reason to support reforms insofar as they help fulfill this obligation. So, 
subsequent sections consider some ways of capturing the environmental benefits 
while avoiding the environmental costs of free trade. 
 Of course, all other things are not equal. Unfettered free trade might be the best 
way, for instance, to promote growth or democracy.43 Thus, the best trade policies 
may balance environmental improvements against other important moral objec-
tives. But this paper will not consider such tradeoffs.44 Even if they are necessary, 
it is important to look for constructive, creative ways of capturing the benefits and 
avoiding the costs of free trade for the environment. After all, we need to know 
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 50 Fair trade coffee is usually shade grown, for instance. Coffee produced in this way is grown un-
der the rain forest’s canopy rather than in clearings usually created by burning down rain forests. See 
what ways of reworking the rules of trade or working around them mitigate envi-
ronmental problems to figure out when (and what) tradeoffs are required. In the 
next section, I consider some ways of capturing the benefits and avoiding the costs 
of free trade for the environment.
V. RESTRUCTURING THE RULES OF TRADE
 Environmental ethicists do not have reason to support isolationism or unfettered 
free trade. Rather, they have reason to support policies (protectionist or not) that 
reduce environmental problems.45 This seemingly innocuous proposition contravenes 
international law embodied in institutions like the wTO, however.46 The WTO 
makes some provisions for the environment. Article XX of the GATT/wTO agree-
ment suspends the most favored nation and national treatment rules to protect the 
environment, for instance. But these provisions are not as broad as those suggested 
here. So, if my conclusions are correct, there is reason to consider changing some 
of the rules of trade. The wTO might, for instance, require countries benefiting 
from trade to compensate for trade-related damage to the environment. The WTO 
might, for example, require trading countries to plant new trees to compensate for 
the pollution caused by transporting goods long distances.47 
 More radically, the wTO might allow otherwise impermissible trade barriers if 
they mitigate environmental problems. Consider an example of how a trade bar-
rier might help the environment. Suppose that Japan is the main consumer of a 
certain kind of hardwood that can only be found in the Amazon. If Japan prohibits 
imports of this wood, then, ceteris paribus, less rain forest may be destroyed. The 
environment may benefit.
 Even individuals can promote free trade that mitigates environmental problems.48 
Individuals might, for example, buy Sustainable forestry initiative or fair Trade 
certified goods.49 The Sustainable Forestry Initiative certifies that wood products 
have been sustainably harvested. And, usually, producers must use environmentally 
friendly production processes to gain Fair Trade certification.50 Consumer movements 
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will probably not ameliorate all of free trade’s negative effects on the environment. 
But if many people demand environmentally friendly goods, companies may insti-
tute better production standards and, in doing so, greatly mitigate environmental 
problems. Altering the WTO (and other international organizations) may help the 
Sustainable Forestry and Fair Trade Initiatives. The WTO might require countries 
to label goods produced in sustainable ways as Sustainable Forestry Initiative or 
Fair Trade certified, for instance. But, consumer action is powerful. when U.S. 
consumers demanded dolphin safe tuna, the tuna-fishing industry changed despite 
WTO protests. 
VI. OBJECTIONS
 There are many ways of changing or working around the rules of trade to reduce 
environmental problems. Because some require changing or working around in-
ternational trade law, in this section, I consider objections to using trade policy to 
mitigate environmental problems. In this inquiry, I isolate some of the conditions 
that must hold for the above proposals to be acceptable.
 Taxes and oTheR maRkeT RefoRms aRe moRe efficienT Than TRade baRRieRs
 Trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas are among the most controversial trade 
policies. One of the primary objectives of institutions such as the wTO is to encourage 
countries to reduce trade barriers. Many argue that trade barriers are an inefficient 
ways of protecting the environment.51 Tariffs, for instance, are supposed to be 
less efficient than other taxes because they have a narrow base (tariffs are usually 
applied to individual commodities).52 When taxes apply to more goods or people, 
they are harder to avoid and it is the costs associated with people trying to avoid 
taxes that make them inefficient. If a tax makes corn more expensive than wheat, 
people can purchase wheat instead. People have few alternatives to paying a tax 
on food even if food becomes more expensive than other commodities when it is 
taxed. It is even harder to avoid a tax on all goods and services. So, the proponent 
of unfettered free trade might conclude, we should use taxation (or other market 
reforms) to mitigate environmental problems, not trade barriers. 
 The proponent of free trade is right that we should consider using taxes and other 
market reforms to address environmental problems.53 Global taxation or regula-
tions may be wonderfully effective in protecting the environment. we might follow 
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Thomas Pogge’s suggestion to tax natural resources, for instance.54 Emissions 
trading schemas like those in the kyoto protocol are also promising. But which 
taxes or market reforms are best depends on many things. In theory, trade barriers 
can be just as good and efficient as taxation (or other kinds of market reforms) at 
achieving moral objectives.55 Although we cannot go into the details here, there is a 
wealth of theoretical and empirical literature in public and international economics 
on how different trade barriers and other market reforms affect efficiency.56 Some 
trade barriers may be more efficient than other means of achieving moral objec-
tives.57 Finally, even if we granted that, in theory, trade barriers are usually inferior 
to other market reforms, the economic models used to estimate the efficiency of 
different reforms are often unrealistic.58 Political considerations not included in the 
models may, for instance, tell in favor of trade barriers rather than other alternatives. 
Developed countries and producers may be more likely to support tariffs than other 
taxes. Alternately, the only realistic way to get countries to address environmental 
problems may be to threaten them with trade barriers.59 Joseph Stiglitz, formerly 
the chief economist at the world Bank, seems to take this view. He argues that 
the wTO should allow countries to use trade barriers to sanction the U.S. for not 
paying the costs of the damage it causes to the environment.60
 iT is Too haRd To PRedicT consequences of TRade baRRieRs
 Those with a libertarian bent might raise a different objection to allowing countries 
to use trade barriers when doing so will benefit the environment. They might argue 
that the very suggestion presupposes the possibility of fine-tuned social engineer-
ing. It is not clear that we have the knowledge we need to decide whether allowing 
particular countries to implement particular tariffs will benefit the environment. 
Moreover, even if it is possible to analyze the prospects for different tariffs to benefit 
the environment, this analysis may be expensive and difficult. Institutions such as 
the wTO have enough to do without evaluating every possible tariff. The objector 
might contend that this objection is particularly pressing in light of the fact that 
those seeking protection from competition often use the guise of environmentalism 
to garner support for unfair trade barriers that do not benefit (or even harm) the 
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environment. U.S. firms that want import restrictions on Canadian softwood lum-
ber may be using the environment as an excuse for protectionism.61 Protectionists 
seeking profit may even trick environmentalists into supporting environmentally 
harmful protectionism. 
 Although there is something to this objection, it is not clear that it is correct. It 
might not be very expensive or difficult to figure out that some trade barriers will 
benefit the environment. Some trade agreements provide environmental impact 
assessments of their policies already.62 Nor need institutions such as the WTO 
be responsible for doing the relevant calculations. Perhaps international trade or-
ganizations could allow countries to use trade barriers to benefit the environment 
as long as countries declare their intentions to use these barriers publicly and are 
prepared to justify their barriers if challenged. Non-governmental organizations and 
academics might, then, help developing countries that lack the capacity or resources 
to do the requisite assessment. The details would need to be worked out carefully, 
and it is important to make sure impact assessments would stay current.  
 At least, however, if good assessments support using trade barriers to mitigate 
environmental problems, institutions such as the wTO should allow the barriers. 
To mitigate the threat of hidden protectionism masquerading as concern for the 
environment, however, international trade organizations’ dispute resolution panels 
would probably have to create standards for judging whether protectionist measures 
will mitigate environmental problems.63 Fortunately, there is some sign that this 
may already be happening for some kinds of environmentally motivated trade poli-
cies.64 In the future, these organizations might even allow protectionism that is not 
environmentally motivated as long as it is best for the environment. Some collusion 
by those seeking protection from competition and those genuinely concerned about 
the environment may be best for the environment. It may be possible to educate 
those who care about the environment so that they can protest against hidden pro-
tectionism that does not benefit the environment. It is risky to allow protectionism 
since it can cause environmental problems. But, the fact that protectionism can 
hurt the environment does not tell against using protectionism (when possible) to 
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benefit the environment. If restricting imports of Canadian softwood lumber does 
help the environment, restrictions may be justifiable.
 using TRade Policy To Reduce enviRonmenTal PRoblems is unjusT
 Perhaps one could object that using trade policy to reduce environmental prob-
lems is unjust. One might argue that because people in different countries have 
different preferences, resources, and needs, each country should get to decide what 
it wants to do about environmental problems.65 Even though some countries are 
ruled by despots, countries’ decisions may require respect. One might suggest that 
preventing countries from fulfilling their preferences is unjust because it is pater-
nalistic and violates sovereignty.66 Respecting China’s sovereignty, for instance, 
might require allowing it to set its own priorities even if it foolishly chooses not 
to protect the environment. Outsiders may not be justified in using trade policy 
to get China to protect the environment even if it is in China’s best interests to do 
so.67 The objector might conclude that countries concerned about environmental 
problems should only address problems within their own borders. Institutions such 
as the WTO should prohibit trade policy intended to get other countries to protect 
the environment and countries should refrain from pursuing such policy.
 There are at least three problems with this argument. First, using trade policy 
to protect the environment may not be paternalistic. Such policy may neither be 
intended to promote other interests of countries nor succeed in doing so. (Some 
countries might do better to pollute, for instance.) Second, using trade policy to 
protect the environment may not violate sovereignty. If sovereignty is unlimited, 
sovereign states should be able to impose whatever trade barriers they want. If 
sovereignty is limited, it may not violate sovereignty to use trade policy to get a 
country to protect the environment. Finally, even if using trade policy to mitigate 
environmental problems is paternalistic and infringes on sovereignty that does not 
show that such policy is unjust. It may be justifiable to violate sovereignty even if 
doing so is paternalistic as long as doing so is necessary to mitigate environmental 
problems. Some theories of justice may support the conclusion that using trade 
policy to mitigate environmental problems is unjust. But in the absence of such a 
theory, this objection does not succeed.
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 allowing TRade Policy To PRoTecT The enviRonmenT may imPede develoPmenT
 Finally, it may harm the global poor to allow countries to use trade policy to get 
other countries to protect the environment. China and India (as well as the U.S.) 
are likely targets for such policy. These countries emit a lot of green house gas. 
But China and India are developing countries. They may be justified in using their 
resources to foster the development that will eliminate poverty and it may be neces-
sary to increase emissions to do so. If countries such as China and India are forced 
to protect the environment, they may also have to reduce spending on poverty 
relief. 
 This is a serious concern. But even granting that it would be impermissible to require 
developing countries to protect the environment if doing so impeded development, 
the objection is not conclusive. The objection only shows that it is impermissible 
to use trade policy to get developing countries to protect the environment without 
also helping them reduce poverty. Countries imposing trade barriers that impede 
development but help the environment might implement other policies that com-
pensate for these barriers’ negative impacts on the poor. The lesson here is quite 
general. If using trade policy to protect the environment interferes with other things 
that matter, it may still be acceptable for a country to use trade policy to protect the 
environment as long as it compensates for those barriers' negative impacts. The rents 
countries can gain from imposing some barriers might even be used to compensate 
for those barriers’ negative effects.
VII. CONCLUSION
 In this paper, I considered the case for free trade on the assumption that there is 
an obligation to mitigate environmental problems. I suggested that the “Race to 
the Bottom Argument” against free trade is inconclusive. I then considered some 
empirical evidence regarding free trade’s environmental impact. Although there 
is not enough evidence to conclude that free trade will generally be good or bad 
for the environment, I showed that there is reason to worry about unrestricted free 
trade’s environmental effects. Linkage, consumer movements, and trade barriers 
may be necessary and desirable. At least these ways of reworking or working around 
the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as the World Trade Organization 
deserve serious consideration if they can efficiently reduce environmental problems 
without interfering with other things that matter.
